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th century and 
across the country.  All told, between 2,500 and 3,200 companies successfully 
financed, built, and operated their toll road.  Although most of these roads operated 
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America’s Toll Roads Heritage:   




  Before Americans built the Erie Canal or hammered the first railroad spike, 
private toll roads shaped and accommodated trade and migration routes, leaving social 
and political imprints on the communities that debated and supported them.  Private 
road building came and went in waves throughout the 19
th century and across the 
country.  All told, between 2,500 and 3,200 companies successfully financed, built, 
and operated their toll road.  Although most of these roads operated for only a fraction 
of the 100+ period, the combined mileage of private toll roads that operated at any 
point in time would be in range of 30,000 to 52,000 miles. 
  America’s 100+ year experience with private toll roads offers valuable lessons 
for policymakers and citizens today.  American toll road history is pretty well covered 
by considering three episodes: the turnpike era of the eastern states 1792 to 1845; the 
plank road boom 1847 to 1853; and the toll road of the far West 1850 to 1902.   
 
The Failure of Local Government Road Service 
 
  Prior to the 1790s Americans had no direct experience with private turnpikes; 
roads were built, financed and managed mainly by town governments.  Typically, 
townships compelled a road labor tax. The State of New York assessed eligible males 
(often farmers) a minimum of three days of roadwork under penalty of fine of one 
dollar. The labor requirement could be avoided if the worker paid a fee of 62.5 cents a 
day. As with public works of any kind, incentives were weak because the chain of 2 
activity could not be traced to a residual claimant – that is, private owners who claim 
the “residuals,” profit or loss.  The laborers were brought together in a transitory, 
disconnected manner, preventing them from developing the appropriate skills and 
pride in the job.  Since overseers and laborers were commonly farmers, too often the 
crop schedule, rather than road deterioration, dictated the repairs schedule.  Except in 
cases of special appropriations, financing came in dribbles deriving mostly from the 
fines and commutations of the assessed inhabitants.  Commissioners could hardly lay 
plans for decisive improvements.  When a needed connection passed through 
unsettled lands, it was difficult to mobilize labor because assessments could be 
worked out only in the district in which the laborer resided.  Because work areas were 
divided into districts, as well as into towns, problems arose because the various pieces 
were not working together.  Thus road conditions remained inadequate, as New 
York’s governors often acknowledged publicly (Klein and Majewski, 1992: 472-75). 
 
The Race Is On! 
 
  To American fortune seekers, the ratification of the Constitution was like the 
“bang” of a starting gun.  The Constitution resolved what Robert Higgs (1997) has 
called “regime uncertainty,” by building an interstate framework for financial, legal 
and political affairs (Hurst 1956: 10; North 1966: 50-51).  The race was afoot – to 
capture the trade of the interior, to develop western lands, to expand population, to 
build the leading entrepot.  In 1790, the steamboat was still in its infancy, canal 
construction was hard to finance and limited in scope, and the first American railroad 
would not be completed for another 40 years.  Better transportation meant, above all, 
better highways. 3 
  Alexis de Tocqueville remarked on the impulse of Americans to push onward.  
He describes an attitude about the environment very different than today: 
 
The wonders of inanimate nature leave [Americans] cold, and, one may almost 
say, they do not see the marvelous forests surrounding them until they begin to 
fall beneath the ax.  What they see is something different.  The American 
people see themselves marching through wildernesses, drying up marches, 
diverting rivers, peopling the wilds, and subduing nature.  (Tocqueville, p. 485 
of Lawrence/Mayer ed.) 
 
  America's very limited and lackluster experience with the publicly operated 
toll roads of the 1780s hardly portended a future boom in private toll roads, but the 
success of private toll bridges may have inspired some future turnpike companies. 
From 1786 to 1798, fifty-nine private toll bridge companies were chartered in the 
northeast, beginning with Boston's Charles River Bridge, which brought investors an 
average annual return of 10.5 percent in its first six years (Davis 1917, II: 188).  
Private toll bridges operated without many of the regulations that would hamper the 
private toll roads that soon followed, such as mandatory toll exemptions and conflicts 
over the location of toll gates.  Also, toll bridges, by their very nature, faced little toll 
evasion, which was a serious problem for toll roads. 
  The more significant predecessor to America's private toll road movement was 
Britain's success with private toll roads.  Beginning in 1663 and peaking from 1750 to 
1772, Britain experienced a private turnpike movement large enough to acquire the 
nickname “turnpike mania” (Pawson 1977,151; Benson this volume).  The term 
“turnpike,” in fact, comes from Britain, referring to a long staff (or pike) that acted as 4 
a swinging barrier or tollgate.  In 19
th century America, “turnpike” specifically means 
a toll road with a surface of gravel and earth, as opposed to “plank roads” which refer 
to toll roads surfaced by wooden planks.  Later in the century, all such roads were 
typically just “toll roads.” 
Although the British movement inspired the future American turnpike 
movement, the institutional differences between the two were substantial. Most 
important, perhaps, was the difference in their organizational forms. British turnpikes 
were incorporated as trusts -- non-profit organizations financed by bonds -- while 
American turnpikes were stock-financed corporations seemingly organized to pay 
dividends, though acting within narrow limits determined by the charter. Contrary to 
modern sensibilities, this difference made the British trusts, which operated under the 
firm expectation of fulfilling bond obligations, more intent and more successful in 
garnering residuals.  In contrast, for the American turnpikes the hope of dividends was 
merely a hope, usually a faint hope, and never a legal obligation.  Odd as it sounds, 
the stock-financed “business” corporation was better suited to operating the project as 
a civic enterprise, paying out returns in use and esteem rather than cash. 
 
 
The Turnpike Era, 1792–1845 
 
  “[T]he states admitted that they were unequal to the task and enlisted the aid 
of private enterprise” (Durrenberger 1931, 37).  The first private turnpike in the 
United States was chartered by Pennsylvania in 1792 and opened two years later. 
Spanning 62 miles between Philadelphia and Lancaster, it quickly attracted the 
attention of merchants in other states, who recognized its potential to direct commerce 5 
away from their regions. Soon lawmakers from those states began chartering 
turnpikes -- and the race was on. 
  By 1800, 69 turnpike companies had been chartered throughout the country, 
especially in Connecticut (23) and New York (13). Over the next decade nearly six 
times as many turnpikes were incorporated (398).  Table 1 shows that in the mid-
Atlantic and New England states between 1800 and 1830, turnpike companies 
accounted for 27 percent of all business incorporations. 
 
   
Table 1. Turnpikes as a Percentage of All Business Incorporations, 
by Special and General Acts, 1800-1830. 
[For Source, we could alternatively just say Klein and Majewski 1992: 470.] 
 
 
As shown in Table 2, a wider set of states had incorporated 1562 turnpikes by the end 
of 1845.  Somewhere between 50 to 70 percent of these succeeded in building and 
operating toll roads. 
 
 




1801-10 1811-20 1821-30 1831-40 1841-45  Total 
NH  4  45 5 1 4 0  59 
VT  9  19 15 7 4 3  57 
MA  9  80 8 16 1 1  115 
RI  3  13 8 13 3 1  41 
CT  23  37 16 24 13 0  113 
NY  13  126 133 75 83 27  457 
PA  5  39 101 59 101 37  342 
NJ  0  22 22 3 3 0  50 
VA  0  6 7 8 25 0  46 
MD  3  9 33 12 14 7  78 
OH  0  2 14 12 114 62  204 
Total  69  398 362 230 365 138  1562 
Table 2. Turnpike Incorporation, 1792-1845 
Sources: For all states through 1800, Joseph Stancliffe Davis, Essays in the 
Earlier History of American Corporations (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1948), 
II, pp. 22-27, 216; for NH, VT, MA, and RI, 1801-1845, Philip E. Taylor, "The 
Turnpike Era in New England," (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University, 1934), pp. 339-
344, 346; for CT, 1801-1821, Nathaniel Reed, "The Role of the Connecticut 
State Government in the Development and Operation of the Inland 
Transportation Facilities from 1784 to 1821," (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 
1964), p. 75; for CT, 1822-1845, Taylor, pp. 338-339; for NY, NJ, MD, and 
OH, 1801-1845, George Herberton Evans, Jr., Business Incorporation in the 
United States, 1800-1943 (New York, 1948), pp. 12-17; for PA, 1801-1845, 
William Miller, "A Note on the History of Business Incorporation in 
Pennsylvania, 1800-1860," Quarterly Journal of Economics 55 (November, 
1940), pp. 158-159; for Virginia, Robert F. Hunter, "The Turnpike Movement 
in Virginia, 1816-1860," (Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1957), pp. 313-
315. 
[For Source, we could alternatively just say Klein and Fielding 1992: 325.] 
 
  Although the states of Pennsylvania, Virginia and Ohio subsidized privately-
operated turnpike companies, most turnpikes were financed solely by private stock 
subscription and structured to pay dividends.  This was a significant achievement, 
considering the large construction costs (averaging around $1,500 to $2,000 per mile) 
and the typical length (15 to 40 miles).  But the achievement was most striking 
because, as New England historian Edward Kirkland (1948:45) put it, “the turnpikes 
did not make money.  As a whole this was true; as a rule it was clear from the 
beginning.”   
  Generally speaking, turnpikes eked out enough toll revenue to pay for 
maintenance, and not more.  Organizers and “investors” generally regarded the initial 7 
proceeds from sale of stock as a fund from which to build the facility, which would 
then earn enough in toll receipts to cover operating expenses.  One might hope for 
dividend payments as well, but “it seems to have been generally known long before 
the rush of construction subsided that turnpike stock was worthless” (Wood 1919: 
63).
2 
  Because turnpikes held the promise of facilitating movement and trade, the 
region’s merchants, farmers, land owners, and ordinary residents would benefit from a 
turnpike.  Gazetteer Thomas F. Gordon  aptly summarized the relationship between 
these “indirect benefits” and investment in turnpikes: “None have yielded profitable 
returns to the stockholders, but everyone feels that he has been repaid for his 
expenditures in the improved value of his lands, and the economy of business” (qtd. in 
Majewski, 2000, 49). Gordon’s statement raises an important question.  If one could 
not be excluded from benefiting from a turnpike, and if dividends were not in the 
offing, what incentive would anyone have to help finance turnpike construction?  The 




  Nevertheless, hundreds of communities overcame the free-rider problem. 
Alexis de Tocqueville observed that, excepting those of the South, Americans were 
infused with a spirit of public-mindedness. Their strong sense of community spirit 
resulted in the funding of schools, libraries, hospitals, churches, canals, dredging 
companies, wharves, and water companies, as well as turnpikes (Goodrich 1948).  
                                                 
2 For a discussion of returns and expectations, see Klein 1990: 791-95.  8 
Vibrant community and cooperation sprung, according to Tocqueville, from the fertile 
ground of liberty: 
 
If it is a question of taking a road past his property, [a man] sees at once that 
this small public matter has a bearing on his greatest private interests, and 
there is no need to point out to him the close connection between his private 
profit and the general interest.  . . .  Local liberties, then, which induce a great 
number of citizens to value the affection of their kindred and neighbors, bring 
men constantly into contact, despite the instincts which separate them, and 
force them to help one another. . . . The free institutions of the United States 
and the political rights enjoyed there provide a thousand continual reminders 
to every citizen that he lives in society.  . . . Having no particular reason to 
hate others, since he is neither their slave nor their master, the American’s 
heart easily inclines toward benevolence.  At first it is of necessity that men 
attend to the public interest, afterward by choice.  What had been calculation 
becomes instinct.  By dint of working for the good of his fellow citizens, he in 
the end acquires a habit and taste for serving them.  . . .  I maintain that there is 
only one effective remedy against the evils which equality may cause, and that 
is political liberty.  (Alexis de Tocqueville, pp. 511-13, Lawrence/Mayer 
edition) 
 
  Tocqueville’s testimonial is broad and general, but its accuracy is seen in the 
archival records and local histories of the turnpike communities.  Here we find 
countless episodes, often charming and amusing, in which early Americans employed 
shrewd social tactics, as well as practiced solidarity and spontaneous generosity.  9 
Tocqueville’s America was a web of neighbors, kin, and locally prominent figures 
interacting voluntarily, often by means of intentional associations.  Tocqueville’s 
America spoke in turnpike appeals made in newspapers, local speeches, town 
meetings, door-to-door solicitations, correspondence, and negotiations in assembling 
the route.
3  Purchasers of stock were often explicitly moved to think of a turnpike's 
potential, not for dividends, but for community improvement.  Furthermore, many toll 
road projects involved the effort to build a monument and symbol of the community.  
Participating in a company by donating cash or giving moral support was a relatively 
rewarding way of establishing public services; it was pursued at least in part for the 
sake of community romance and adventure as ends in themselves (Brown 1973:68).  
Consequently, “investors” tended to be not outside speculators, but locals positioned 
to enjoy the turnpikes' indirect benefits. "But with a few exceptions, the vast majority 
of the stockholders in turnpike were farmers, land speculators, merchants or 
individuals and firms interested in commerce" (Durrenberger 1931, 104). 
Champions of government enterprise in the nineteenth-century persistently 
complained of a “shortage of capital” necessitating government investment, but the 
turnpike movement showed how local projects could tap into savings of numerous 
individuals.  A large number of ordinary households held turnpike stock.   
Pennsylvania compiled the most complete set of investment records, which show that 
more than 24,000 individuals purchased turnpike or toll bridge stock between 1800 
and 1821.  The average holding was $250 worth of stock, and the median was less 
than $150 (Majewski 2001).  Such sums indicate that most turnpike investors were 
wealthier than the average citizen, but hardly part of the urban elite that dominated 
larger corporations such as the Bank of the United States.  County-level studies 
                                                 
3 See Klein 1990: 803-808; Klein and Majewski 1994: 56-61. 10 
indicate that most turnpike investment came from farmers and artisans, as opposed to 
the merchants and professionals more usually associated with early corporations 
(Majewski 2000: 49-53).  Widespread participation by relatively modest investors 
underscores the extent to which Americans practiced boosterism and chipping in for 
the common good.  
 
Government Regulations Hampered Turnpikes 
 
  Government regulation made profitability even more remote than it would 
have been in a more laissez-faire environment. Legislators wrote numerous 
restrictions into the charters, as conciliation towards objectors to both the specific 
project and to turnpike companies in general.  At this time, in many fields, the 
corporate form had a public-service ethos, aimed not primarily at paying dividends, 
but at serving the community (Handlin & Handlin 1945: 22; Goodrich 1948: 306; 
Hurst 1970: 15).  This, however, does not mean that such corporations had a 
governmental flavor, just that they did not have a strongly commercial or market 
flavor.   
  Turnpike opposition was of two kinds: ideological and opportunistic. Some 
opponents claimed that turnpikes were tools of aristocrats, corporate monopolists, and 
oppressors of the poor. Most opposition, however, came from those who used protest 
as a means of gaining what they no doubt saw as just concessions (Klein and 
Majewski 1992: 486-98).  A significant portion of turnpikes were built partly over 
paths, trails or ill-maintained roads that the public had been accustomed to using 
without charge. Petitions yielded several restrictions on turnpike operators, including 
“progressive” restrictions on stockholder voting and specification of road quality, toll 11 
rates, toll gate locations, and toll exemptions. Toll gates, for example, often could be 
spaced no closer than every five or even ten miles. This regulation enabled some users 
to travel without encountering a toll gate, and eased the practice of steering horses and 
the high-mounted vehicles of the day off the main road so as to evade the toll gate, a 
practice known as "shunpiking." 
  The charters or general laws granted numerous exemptions from toll payment. 
In New York, the exempt included people traveling on family business, those 
attending or returning from church services and funerals, town meetings, blacksmith's 
shops, those on military duty, and those who lived within one mile of a toll gate. In 
Massachusetts some of the same trips were exempt and also anyone residing in the 
town where the gate is placed and anyone “on the common and ordinary business of 
family concerns” (Laws of Mass., 1805, Chap. 79: 649).  Needless to say, this last was 
the subject of some controversy. In the face of exemptions and shunpiking, turnpike 
operators sometimes petitioned authorities for a toll hike, stiffer penalties against 
shunpikers, or the relocating of the toll gate.  The record indicates that petitioning the 
legislature for such relief was a costly and uncertain affair (Klein and Majewski 1992: 
496-98). 
  Turnpikes were also encouraged by government, sometimes by the granting of 
existing trails or public roadbeds to turnpikes, sometimes guarantees against new 
parallel routes, and typically the granting of eminent domain powers. Were these 
governmentally granted aids important?  After surveying the historical sources and 
digging into many primary materials, we really cannot say.  We suspect that, by and 
large, landowners, sensible to the prospects of improved transportation and higher 
land values, sold or even gave land to turnpike routes in the same neighborly spirit 12 
that Tocqueville described
4 – and that they would have readily done so even if 
companies had not had eminent domain powers.  Playing “holdout” games surely 
would have seemed unneighborly; cooperating would be a genuine and highly visible 
act of generosity and public spirit.  In the 1990s, toll road projects in Virginia and 
southern California benefited from just such willing participation from large 
landowners. 
  A few state governments (in Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Ohio) even 
encouraged turnpikes by purchasing stock. Yet despite these advantages, all but a few 
turnpikes lost money.  In New York, under state law, tolls could be collected only 
after turnpikes passed inspections, which were typically conducted after 10 miles of 
roadway had been built. Only 35 to 40 percent of New York turnpike projects -- or 
about 165 companies -- reached operational status.  In Connecticut, by contrast, where 
settlement covered the state and turnpikes more often took over existing roadbeds, 
construction costs were much lower and about 87 percent of the companies reached 
operation (Taylor 1934: 210).  We guess that up to 1845 nationwide at least one-third 
of the chartered companies never constructed enough roadway to justify a tollgate. 
 
Ye Olde Privatization Debate 
 
  Although it was mainly practical ambitions that led Americans to privatize the 
roads, ideological concerns occasionally appeared in the arguments of both turnpike 
supporters and opponents. In an article in the Albany (NY) Register of June 13, 1796, 
Elkanah Watson, a leading turnpike advocate, argued for highway user fees by 
appealing to moral sentiments similar to what we might hear articulated by a 
                                                 
4 Illustrative tidbits are found at Klein 1990: 807. 13 
contemporary privatization advocate: "[N]o tax can operate so fair and so easy, as that 
of paying a turnpike toll, since every person is taxed in proportion to the benefit he 
derives from a good road, and all strangers and travellers are made equally tributary to 
its support -- What can be more just?" (qtd. in Klein and Majewski 1992: 481) 
  Strongly committed to the cause of turnpikes, Watson even kept track of his 
opponents' arguments in his scrapbook. His chief opponent, “Civis,” claimed that 
turnpiking is "hostile to sound republican maxims," that it "evinces a transition...from 
freedom toward despotism," that turnpikes "encourage unfair speculation," that they 
"tend to make the rich richer and the poor poorer [and] divide the community into two 
orders of opposite interests, payers and receivers.”  Civis raised the specter of 
corporate privilege: “it is not turnpike corporations only that excite my apprehension.  
[W]e are continually incorporating companies of various description, of a combined 
interest, distinct from the general interest of the people” (Klein and Majewski 1992: 
488).  Such arguments are, of course, alive and well today.   
  According to Watson, “[s]trong prejudices have been excited against 
Turnpikes . . . by a few leatherheads.”  In America’s first era of road privatization, 
people realized very quickly that turnpikes were not rapacious monopolies but rather 
locally-initiated improvement projects looking to the legislature mainly for the 
permission to go forward as a legally recognized undertaking.  In 1802, Watson 
scribbled into his notebook: 
 
this Civis was a member of the Legislature[,] a Doct[or] M[oses] Younglove 
from Columbia County – a man seeking popularity – he found means to 
prejudice 2/3’s of an ignorant Legislature who were opposing Turnpike 14 
incorporations . . . – at length t’wards the Close of the Session . . . they gave 
way to Reason & conviction & several turnpikes were incorporated.   
 
The Success of Private Initiative 
 
  All told, and in view of the apparent free-rider problem, the success was 
striking. The movement built new roads at rates previously unheard of in America.  
Table 3 gives ballpark estimates of the cumulative investment in constructing 
turnpikes up to 1830 in New England and the Middle Atlantic.  Repair and 
maintenance costs are excluded. These construction investment figures are probably 
too low—they generally exclude, for example, tolls revenue that might have been 
used to finish construction—but they nevertheless indicate the ability of private 
initiatives to raise money in an economy in which capital was in short supply.  
Turnpike companies in these states raised more than $24 million by 1830, an amount 
equaling 6.15 percent of those states’ 1830 GDP.  To put this into comparative 
perspective, between 1956 and 1995 all levels of government spent $330 billion (in 
1996 dollars) in building the interstate highway system, a cumulative total equaling 
only 4.30 percent of 1996 GDP.  Table 3 shows the comparison.  This calculation 
confirms Gerald Gunderson’s claim that the relative investment in early American 
turnpikes exceeded investment in the post-World War II interstate highway system 
(Gunderson 1989: 192).  In real per capita terms the amount that was raised 
voluntarily in Tocqueville’s America significantly exceeded the amount raised in 



















New Hampshire  575,100 2.11 2.14 
Vermont 484,000 3.37 1.72 
Massachusetts 4,200,000 7.41 6.88 
Rhode Island  140,000 1.54 1.44 
Connecticut 1,036,160 4.68 3.48 
New York  9,000,000 7.06 4.69 
New Jersey  1,100,000 4.79 3.43 
Pennsylvania 6,400,000 6.67 4.75 
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Cumulative Turnpike Investment (1800-1830) as Percentage of 1830 GDP 
 
 
Sources:   Pennsylvania turnpike investment: Durrenberger 1931: 61; New England turnpike 
investment: Taylor 1934: 210-11; New York, New Jersey, and Maryland turnpike investment: Fishlow 
2000, 549.  Only private investment is included.  State GDP data come from Bodenhorn 2000: 237.  
Figures for the cost of the Interstate Highway System can be found at 
http://www.publicpurpose.com/hwy-is$.htm, created by Wendell Cox and calculated from Federal 
Highway Administration data.  Please note that our investment figures generally do not include 
investment to finish roads by loans or the use of toll revenue.  The table therefore underestimates 
investment in turnpikes. 
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  The organizational advantages of turnpike companies relative to government 
road care did indeed translate into roads of better quality (Taylor 1934: 334; Parks 
1967: 23, 27).  New York state gazetteer Horatio Spafford (1824: 125) wrote that 
turnpikes have been “an excellent school, in every road district, and people now work 
the highways to much better advantage than formerly.”  In case law, judges said that 
turnpikes were “valuable and meritorious enterprises” and that they further “the 
advancement and prosperity of the commercial, agricultural and social interests of the 
community” (qtd. in Klein & Majewski 1992: 502). 
 
Spontaneous Network Integration 
 
  Transportation researchers, theorists, and engineers exhibit their own versions 
of the timeless division between central planning and decentralized (or 
“spontaneous”) order.  Speaking for “The Systems Approach to Transport Planning,” 
David T. Kresge and Paul O. Roberts (1971: 1) wrote in a book published by The 
Brookings Institution, “any comprehensive, long-run transport plan will need to take 
into account the interdependency between the transport system and the general 
economy as well as the systems or interaction effects within the transport network 
itself.”  Only a centralized agency would have the responsibility to survey the whole 
system, and only such an agency could have the authority to integrate its parts and 
coordinate its functions.  Such integration and coordination could never be achieved 
by piecemeal or decentralized efforts (Christopher Nash 1988 propounds this view in 
urban transit research). 
  Albert Gallatin, Secretary of Treasury under Jefferson, was America’s first 
national transportation planner.  He submitted a plan for an interlocking national 17 
system of roads and canals, to be financed chiefly by the federal government (once the 
Constitution was suitably amended).  One rationale was to bind the Union politically.  
But also he wrote in the central planning spirit: “The National Legislature alone, 
embracing every local interest, and superior to every local consideration, is competent 
to the selection of such national objects” (p. 741).  Furthermore, Gallatin argued that 
private capital was too scarce to undertake large, risky improvement projects.  
Gallatin’s plan was never enacted, but it did help to win support for federal funding of 
certain internal improvement projects. 
  Despite such doubts about private action, the turnpike experience suggests that 
a company would intelligently develop roadway to achieve connective 
communication.  The corporate form traversed town and county boundaries, so a 
single company could bring what would otherwise be separate segments together into 
a single organization.  “Merchants and traders in New York sponsored pikes leading 
across northern New Jersey in order to tap the Delaware Valley trade which would 
otherwise have gone to Philadelphia” (Lane 1939: 156).  Or road organizers would 
develop new connecting pieces in a system of roads.   
Decades before the Erie Canal, private individuals realized the natural opening 
through the Appalachians and planned a system of turnpikes connecting Albany to 
Syracuse and beyond.  Figure 1 shows the principal routes westward from Albany.  
The upper route begins with the Albany & Schnectady Turnpike, connects to the 
Mohawk Turnpike, and then the Seneca Turnpike.  The lower route begins with the 
First Great Western Turnpike and then branches at Cherry Valley into the Second and 
Third Great Western Turnpikes.  Corporate papers of these companies reveal that 
organizers of different companies talked to each other; they were quite capable of 
coordinating their intentions and planning mutually beneficial activities by voluntary 18 
means (see inset letter).  When the Erie Canal was completed in 1825 it roughly 
followed the alignment of the upper route and greatly reduced travel on the competing 




Figure 1: Turnpike Network in Central New York, 1845. 
 
[Note to publisher: Dan Klein (dklein@scu.edu) has this figure also in two higher 





Another excellent example of network integration achieved by voluntary 
planning is the Pittsburgh Pike.  The Pennsylvania route consisted of a combination of 
five turnpike companies, each of which built a road segment connecting Pittsburgh 
and Harrisburg, where travelers could take another series of turnpikes to Philadelphia. 
Completed in 1820, the Pittsburgh Pike greatly improved freighting over the rugged 
Allegheny Mountains.   Freight rates between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh were cut in 
half because wagons increased their capacity, speed, and certainty (Reiser 1951, 76-
77).  Although the state government invested in the companies that formed the 
Pittsburgh Pike, records of the two companies for which we have complete investment 
information shows that private interests contributed 62 percent of the capital 
(calculated from Majewski 2000: 47-51: Reiser 1951: 76).  Residents in numerous 
   Januray  29,  1803 
Dear Sir [Charles R. Webster], 
  This will be handed to you by Dr. Moore whom I take the liberty of 
introducing to your acquaintance --  Dr. Moore is sent by a number of 
inhabitants in this neighborhood as an agent for the purpose of obtaining a 
grant for a Turnpike road . . .  [T]his road is nothing more than a 
continuation of the [First] Great Western Turnpike of which I observe that 
you are a Director, and as such I request the favor of you to consult with Dr. 
Moore upon the subject and to lend him all the assistance in your power, 
which I am persuaded you will readily grant, not only for my sake, but from 
a full persuasion that the road which we have in view will be highly 
beneficial to your Turnpike, as well as to the community at large – 
  With sincere friendship and regard I remain 
    Dear Sir your friend and humble servant 
    J.  Lincklaen 
 
[John Lincklaen’s project took the name Third Great Western Turnpike and 
was chartered later that year 1803; Lincklaen was President and a major 
stockholder.  The turnpike operated until 1859.  See map here for its place in 
the network of private roads.] 
 
Note: We have corrected spelling and written out abbreviations. 
Source: Fairchild Collection, New York Public Library, NYC, Box 5. 
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communities contributed to individual projects out of their own self interest.  Their 
provincialism nevertheless helped create a coherent and logical system. 
In the far West, there were even road systems developed by a single 
entrepreneur.  In southwestern Colorado, Otto Mears built a system which “comprised 
some 300 or 400 route miles” (Ridgway 1932: 169; Kaplan 1975).  In Shasta and 
Trinity counties, California, William S. Lowden had a large interest in several toll 
road and bridge companies (Cage 1984). 
Many have claimed that we need master planning by government to achieve 
coordinated, integrated transportation networks.  But history would seem to refute that 
claim. 
 
The National Road: America’s First Great and Glorious Federal Boondoggle 
 
The Pittsburgh Pike fared far better than centrally planned routes such as the 
National Road.  Financed by the federal government, the National Road was built 
between Cumberland, Maryland, and Wheeling, West Virginia, where it was then 
extended through the Midwest with the hopes of reaching the Mississippi River.  
Although it never reached the Mississippi, the Federal Government nevertheless spent 
$6.8 million on the project (Goodrich 1960: 54, 65).  The trans-Appalachian section 
of the National Road competed directly against the Pittsburgh Pike.  As noted above, 
the state of Pennsylvania invested in the Pittsburgh Pike, but the state government 
tended to be a passive investor.  The Pittsburgh Pike was thus far more private in 
character than the National Road.  From the records of two of the five companies that 
formed the Pittsburgh Pike, we estimate it cost $4,805 per mile to build (Majewski, 
2000: 47-51: Reiser 1951: 76).  The Federal government, on the other hand, spent 21 
$13,455 per mile to complete the first 200 miles of the National Road (Fishlow 2000: 
549).  Besides costing much less, the condition of the privately controlled 
Pennsylvania route was much better.  The toll gates along the Pittsburgh Pike 
provided a steady stream of revenue for maintenance and repairs.  The toll gates also 
provided a way of regulating road use, such as discouraging the use of narrow-
wheeled wagons that could damaged the road’s surface. 
Lacking private owners, the National Road was often in poor condition.  The 
project relied on intermittent outlays by the federal government for repairs.  Even 
when the money was available the results were poor because supervision of 
contractors was lax.  Since there was no means of regulating road use, travelers often 
abused the road by dragging heavy logs or locking narrow-wheeled wagons when 
descending steep slopes.  One army engineer in 1832 found “the road in a shocking 
condition, and every rod of it will require great repair; some of it now is almost 
impassable” (qtd. in Searight, p. 60).  Another traveler sardonically noted that “the 
ruts are worn so broad and deep by heavy travel, that an army of pigmies might march 
into the bosom of the country under the cover they could afford” (qtd in Peyton, p. 
149).  No wonder that historians have found that travelers generally preferred to take 
the Pittsburgh Pike rather than the  National Road.  Reuben Gold Thwaites, who 
edited 32 volumes of travelers’ accounts dating from 1746 to 1846, concluded that 
“Much ado was made over the opening of the Cumberland Road across the 
Alleghenies [the National Road], but . . . the central Pennsylvania route [the 
Pittsburgh Pike] seems to have been the popular one from Washington and 
Philadelphia to Pittsburgh” (Thwaites, vol. 9, 1907: 64-65.) 
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The Plank Road Boom, 1847–1853   
 
  By the 1840s the major turnpikes were increasingly eclipsed by the (often 
state-subsidized) canals and railroads. Many toll roads reverted to free public use and 
quickly degenerated into miles of dust, mud and wheel-carved ruts. To link to the new 
and more powerful modes of communication, well-maintained, short-distance 
highways were still needed, but because governments became overextended in poor 
investments in canals, taxpayers were increasingly reluctant to fund internal 
improvements. Private entrepreneurs found the cost of the technologically most 
attractive road surfacing material (macadam, a compacted covering of crushed stones) 
prohibitively expensive at $3,500 per mile. Thus the ongoing need for new feeder 
roads spurred the search for innovation, and plank roads -- toll roads surfaced with 
wooden planks -- seemed to fit the need. 
  The plank road technique appears to have been introduced into Canada from 
Russia in 1840. It reached New York a few years later, after the village Salina, near 
Syracuse, sent civil engineer George Geddes to Toronto to investigate. After two trips 
Geddes (whose father, James, was an engineer for the Erie and Champlain Canals, 
and an enthusiastic canal advocate) was convinced of the plank roads' feasibility and 
became their great booster. Plank roads, he wrote in Scientific American (Geddes 
1850a), could be built at an average cost of $1,500 -- although $1,900 would have 
been more accurate (Majewski, Baer and Klein 1994, 109, fn15). Geddes also 
published a pamphlet containing an influential, if overly optimistic, estimate that 
Toronto’s road planks had lasted eight years (Geddes 1850b). 
  No less important than plank road economics and technology were the public 
policy changes that accompanied plank roads. Policymakers, perhaps aware that 23 
overly restrictive charters had hamstrung the first turnpike movement, were more 
permissive in the plank road era. Adjusting for deflation, toll rates were higher, toll 
gates were separated by shorter distances, and fewer local travelers were exempted 
from payment of tolls. 
  Although few today have heard of them, for a short time it seemed that plank 
roads might be one of the great innovations of the day.  In just a few years, more than 
1,000 companies built more than 10,000 miles of plank roads nationwide, including 
more than 3,500 miles in New York  (Klein and Majewski 1994; Majewski, Baer, 
Klein 1993). According to one observer, plank roads, along with canals and railroads, 
were “the three great inscriptions graven on the earth by the hand of modern science, 
never to be obliterated, but to grow deeper and deeper” (Bogart, 1851). 
  Except for most of New England, plank roads were chartered throughout the 
United States, especially in the top lumber-producing states of the Midwest and Mid-
Atlantic states, as shown in Table 3.  
 
State  Number






North Carolina  54
Missouri  49







Rhode Island, Maine  0
Total 1388 
Table 3. Plank Road Incorporation by State 
Notes: The figure for Ohio is through 1851; Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and 
Maryland are through 1857.  Few plank roads were incorporated after 1857.  24 
In western states, some roads were incorporated and built as plank roads, so 
the 1388 total is not to be taken as a total for the nation.  For a complete 




New York, the leading lumber state, had both the greatest number of plank road 
charters (350) and the largest value of lumber production ($13,126,000 in 1849 
dollars). Plank roads were especially popular in rural dairy counties, where farmers 
needed quick and dependable transportation  to urban markets (Majewski, Baer and 
Klein 1993). 
  The plank road and eastern turnpike episodes shared several features in 
common. As in the early eastern turnpike movement, investment in plank road 
companies came from local landowners, farmers, merchants, and professionals.  Stock 
purchases were motivated less by the prospect of earning dividends than by the 
convenience and increased trade and development that the roads would bring.  To 
many communities, plank roads held the hope of revitalization and the reversal (or 
slowing) of relative decline.  But attaining these benefits, again, faced a free-rider 
problem.  Thus, investors in plank roads, like the investors of the earlier turnpikes, 
also were motivated often by esteem mechanisms -- community allegiance and 
appreciation, reputational incentives, and their own conscience.  
  Table 4 shows the residences of plank road stockholders in five New York 
counties that each had a large city and an agricultural hinterland.  Only 26 percent of 
the funding came from the five big cities, even though the five cities had 36 percent of 
the population and 50 percent of the assessed real estate in the five counties.  If people 
bought plank road stock primarily for anticipated dividends, wouldn’t the big city folk 
have taken a larger portion of it?  Rather, this evidence supports the view that stock 
was purchased by townspeople seeking to link up with the big cities and the major rail 25 
and canal connections.  Use and esteem, not dividends, motivated much of the 
participation. 
 
Table 4:  CAPITAL STOCK OWNED BY BIG CITY INVESTORS 
 IN COUNTIES WITH A BIG CITY 
 
 




Big City ($) 
Percentage from 
Big City 
Albany (Albany)  66,800 37,625 56
Erie (Buffalo)  63,675 10,200 16
Monroe (Rochester)  111,175 26,825 24
Oneida (Utica)  264,275 42,950 16
Onondaga (Syracuse)  100,165 40,325 40
 
Totals 606,090 157,925 26
 
Note:  “Total Capital Stock” refers to the total amount of stock purchased by residents of the 
county. 




Although plank roads were smooth and sturdy, faring better in rain and snow 
than did dirt and gravel roads, they lasted only four or five years – not the eight to 
twelve years that promoters had claimed. Thus, the rush of construction ended 
suddenly by 1853, and by 1865 most companies had either switched to dirt and gravel 
surfaces or abandoned their road altogether. 
 
Toll Roads in the Far West, 1850 to 1902 
 
  Unlike the areas served by the earlier turnpikes and plank roads, Colorado, 
Nevada, and California in the 1850s and 1860s were the frontier.  These areas lacked 
the settled communities and social networks that induce fellows to participate in 
community enterprise and improvement.  Miners and the merchants who served them 26 
knew that the mining boom would not continue indefinitely and therefore seldom 
planted deep roots in their communities.  Nor were the large farms that later populated 
California ripe for civic engagement in anywhere near the degree of the small farm 
communities of the east.  Society in the early years of the West was not one where 
town meetings, door-to-door solicitations, and newspaper campaigns were likely to 
rally broad support for a road project. 
  The lack of strong communities also meant that there would be few opponents 
to pressure the government for toll exemptions and otherwise hamper toll road 
operations. These conditions ensured that toll roads would tend to be more profit-
oriented than the eastern turnpikes and plank road companies.  Still, it is not clear 
whether on the whole the toll roads of the Far West were profitable.  
  The California toll road era began in 1850 after passage of general laws of 
incorporation. In 1853 new laws were passed reducing stock subscription 
requirements from $2,000 per mile to $300 per mile. The 1853 laws also delegated 
regulatory authority to the county governments. Counties were allowed “to set tolls at 
rates not to prevent a return of 20 percent,” but they did not interfere with the location 
of toll roads and usually looked favorably on the toll road companies.   After passage 
of the 1853 laws, the number of toll road incorporations increased dramatically, 
peaking to nearly 40 new incorporations in 1866 alone.  Companies were also created 
by special acts of the legislature.  And sometimes they seemed to have operated 
without formal incorporation at all.  David and Linda Beito (1998: 75, 84) show that 
in Nevada many entrepreneurs had built and operated toll roads – or basic social 
infrastructure – before there was a State of Nevada, and some operated for years 
without any government authority at all.  It wasn’t by the grace of government 27 
“preconditions” that they acted and succeeded.  Freedom to act and security from 
government encroachment is all society needs to move forward.   
All told, in the Golden State, approximately 414 toll road companies were 
initiated,
5 resulting in at least 159 companies that successfully built and operated toll 
roads.  Table 5 provides some rough numbers for toll roads in western states.  The 
numbers presented there are minimums.  For California and Nevada, the numbers are 
probably only slightly under-estimate the true totals; for the other states the figures are 
quite sketchy and might significantly under-estimate true totals.  Again, an abundance 
of testimony indicates that the private road companies were the serious road builders, 
in terms of quantity and quality (see the ten quotations at Klein and Yin 1996: 689-
90). 
 




California 414  159 
Colorado 350  n.a. 
Nevada n.a.  117 
Texas 50 n.a. 
Wyoming 11  n.a. 
Oregon 10  n.a. 
 
Table 5. Rough Minimums on Toll Roads in the West 
Sources: For California, Klein and Yin 1996: 681-82; for Nevada, Beito and Beito 1998: 74; for the 
other states, notes and correspondence in D. Klein’s files. 
 
 
                                                 
5 The 414 figure consists of 222 companies organized under the general law, 102 
charted by the legislature, and 90 companies that we learned of by county records, 
local histories, and various other sources. 
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A Rough Tally 
 
Table 6 makes an attempt to justify guesses about total number of toll road 
companies and total toll road miles.  The first three numbers in the “Incorporations” 
column come from Tables 2, 3, and 5.  The estimates of success rates and average 
road length (in the third and fourth columns) are extrapolations from components that 
have been studied with more care.  We have made these estimates conservative, in the 
sense of avoiding any overstatement of the extent of private road building.   The ~ 
symbol has been used to keep the reader mindful of the fact that many of these 
numbers are guesstimates.  The numbers in the right hand column have been rounded 
to the nearest 1000, so as to avoid any impression of accuracy.  The “Other” row 
throws in a line to suggest a minimum to cover all the regions, periods, and road types 
not covered in Tables 2, 3, and 5.  For example, the “Other” row would cover 
turnpikes in the East, South and Midwest after 1845 (Virginia’s turnpike boom came 
in the late 1840s and 1850s), and all turnpikes and plank roads in Indiana, whose 
county-based incorporation, it seems, has never been systematically researched.  
Ideally, not only would the numbers be more definite and complete, but there would 
be a weighting by years of operation.  The “30,000 – 52,000 miles” should be read as 
a range for the sum of all the miles operated by any company at any time during the 
























from  1792 to 




from 1845 to 
roughly 1860  1388  ~ 65 % ~ 902 ~ 10  ~ 9,000
 
Toll Roads in 
the West 
incorporated 
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guess]  ~ 50 % ~ 500 ~ 16  ~ 8,000
 
Ranges for  
TOTALS 
5,000 - 5,600 
incorporations 









Table 6:  A Rough Tally of the Private Toll Roads 
 Source: Those of Tables 2, 3, and 5, plus the research files of the authors. 
 
Governmental Preconditions for Economic Development? 
 
   
  The success of American toll roads calls into question the prevailing 
assumptions among many historians and developmental economists regarding the 
need for government action.  In 19
th century-America historiography, the larger 
“Commonwealth school,” and to a great extent the mainstream of historians, have 
sought historical precedence and justification for 20
th-century levels of government 30 
activism (see Lively 1955).  Books such as George Rogers Taylor’s The 
Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860 (1951) affirmed the centrality of government 
in establishing order and basic services, the “preconditions” or “framework” of 
American life.  In his State Government and Economic Development: A History 
Administrative Policies in California, 1849-1933, Gerald D. Nash repeatedly suggests 
that the state government was the precondition of enterprise and the source of 
progress. 
  In economics, for ages it has been conventional wisdom that “markets fail” 
when it comes to certain public utilities and public goods, and that government 
intervention and tax dollars are required to build roads.  In the more specialized field 
of development economics, many researchers and officials believe that government 
must provide basic infrastructure to lift a developing society through the early stages 
of economic growth.  These ideas have helped to justify government projects in the 
developing world, as well as foreign aid.  Referring to the early 1960s, a page at the 
Website of the U.S. Agency for International Development (US AID) says: “The 
economic development theory of W.W. Rostow, which posited ‘stages of economic 
development,’ most notably a ‘takeoff into growth’ stage, provided the premise for 
much of the development planning in the newly-formed U.S. Agency for International 
Development” (US AID 2002).  Although the theories of W.W. Rostow may be passé 
in academic circles, the notion that government needs to build (or rebuild) a society’s 
infrastructure remains dominant. 
  America’s vibrant nineteenth-century toll road movement suggests that what is 
really important is freedom to act and security from government encroachment.  It’s 
true that the moral sensibilities of Americans in the 19
th century were especially 
favorable to their lifting themselves up by their own bootstraps.  And it’s true that 31 
throughout the country and the century toll roads companies were typically granted 
eminent domain powers and often pre-existing paths or roadbeds.  But, again, it is by 
no means clear that these forms of privilege and subsidy were crucial (see Bruce 
Benson’s chapter on eminent domain in this volume).  Moreover, these forms are 
minor in comparison to common practice today, namely, funding by taxpayers and 
planning and operation by government.  The massive toll road experience in America, 
spilling over 100+ years, ought to lead one to reconsider any presumption about 
government dominating the field of road provision, as well as any presumption about 
government dominating or leading the process of economic development.   
 
The Toll Road Company versus Progressivism  
 
  In 1880 many toll road companies nationwide continued to operate -- probably 
in the range of 400 to 600 companies.
6  But by 1920 the private toll road was almost 
entirely stamped out.  From Maine to California, the laws and political attitudes from 
around 1880 onward moved against the handling of social affairs in ways that seemed 
informal, inexpert and unsystematic.  Although there was never an age of laissez-
faire, during the late Nineteenth century the social and political mindset was 
becoming something more directly at odds with spontaneous order.  Important social 
affairs would be administered free of peculiar economic or political interests by 
professional experts.  They would centrally plan and optimize systems for the overall 
benefit of society.  The independent private toll road did not fit the program.   
  Progressivism was a burgeoning of collectivist ideology and policy reform.  
Many progressive intellectuals took inspiration from European socialist doctrines.  
                                                 
6 Durrenberger (1931: 164) notes that in 1911 there were 108 turnpikes operating in Pennsylvania 
alone. 32 
Although the politics of restraining corporate evils had a democratic and populist 
aspect, the bureaucratic spirit was highly managerial and hierarchical, intending to 
replicate the efficiency of large corporations in the new professional and scientific 
administration of government (Higgs 1987: 113-116; Ekirch 1967: 171-94).   
  How this translated into public policy was captured by H. L. Mencken in 
1926:  “The Progressive is one who is in favor of more taxes instead of less, more 
bureaus and jobholders, more paternalism and meddling, more regulation of private 
affairs and less liberty.”
7  Progressivism in the U. S. was the first big wave of a sea 
change – the onset of the kind of social democracy (big, democratic government that 
readily taxes, spends, and intervenes in the name of serving “the general welfare”) – 
that now blankets the so-called free world. 
  One might point to the rise of the bicycle and later the automobile, which 
needed a harder and smoother surface.  But that is a demand-side change that does not 
speak to the issues of road ownership and tolling.  Automobiles achieved higher 
speeds, which made stopping to pay a toll more inconvenient, and that may have 
reinforced the anti-toll-road company movement that was underway prior to the 
automobile.  Such developments figured into the history of road policy, but they really 
did not provide a good reason for the policy movement against the toll roads.  The end 
of the toll roads, then, did not come principally from developments in road 
management or technology, or particular failings of the road companies still in 
operation.   
  The following words of a county board of supervisors in New York in 1906 
indicate the methods and ideas used against the toll road companies: 
 
                                                 
7 From an article by Mencken in the Baltimore Evening Sun, January 19, 1926; the passage appears in 
DuBasky 1990: 385. 33 
[T]he ownership and operation of this road by a private corporation is contrary 
to public sentiment in this county, and [the] cause of good roads, which has 
received so much attention in this state in recent years, requires that this 
antiquated system should be abolished.  . . .  That public opinion throughout 
the state is strongly in favor of the abolition of toll roads is indicated by the 
fact that since the passage of the act of 1899, which permits counties to 
acquire these roads, the boards of supervisors of most of the counties where 
such roads have existed have availed themselves of its provisions and 
practically abolished the toll road. 
 
  In other words, county governments are justified in shutting down the 
companies because governments are shutting down the companies.   
  Inside the U. S. Department of Agricultural, the new Office of Road Inquiry 
began in 1893 to gather information, conduct research, and “educate” for better roads.  
They opposed toll roads and the Federal Highway Act of 1916 barred the use of tolls 
on highways receiving federal money (Seely 1987: 15, 79).  Anti-toll-road sentiment 
became state and national policy.  Since then, highways in the U. S. have been run 
mainly along socialist lines, although state governments later reintroduced toll 
financing, and in the 1990s federal resistance to tolling declined and several stretches 
of highway were built and managed by private companies (see Sullivan this volume, 





Lessons for Highway Policy Today 
 
  Toll road history offers perspectives on many sweeping subjects such as the 
potency and forms of voluntary association, the relationship between commerce and 
community, and the changes that have taken place in America’s character and 
ideology.   
  But here we confine ourselves to some highway-policy lessons that apply 
today not only in America but in other countries as well: 
 
•  Private toll-roads brought advantages in terms of quantity, quality, and 
efficiency.  These benefits were apparent in comparison to local government 
road care or the federal government’s National Road.  The virtues of private 
ownership – decisive authority over the resources, private ownership that 
tastes profit and loss, incentives to reduce costs and improve efficiency, 
dependence on the payments of customers, and lack of access to government 
largesse – still recommend private enterprise over government as the way of 
efficiently matching highway supply to demand. 
 
•  Private companies spontaneously developed extensive networks and systems 
of highway.  The notion that highway integration must be centrally planned 
should bear the burden of proof. 
 
•  Over-regulation hampered the old toll roads.  Regulatory demands for better 
service and user concessions often resulted in worse road conditions or no 35 
road at all.  Policymakers today must understand the deleterious long-run 
consequences of restricting private road companies. 
 
•  The old toll roads faced significant regulations, but until the end of the century 
they were pretty confident in the rules of the game.  In modern times the rules 
are prone to change harshly and without much warning.  To give private 
investors the confidence to undertake massive projects that will payoff over 
the course of decades, the government must ensure the integrity of the rules.   
 
•  Unlike the olds, the modern highways are often plagued by traffic jams.  
Today, electronic tolling enables automatic charging without vehicles having 
to stop and without the provision of large toll plazas and toll collectors.  Under 
conditions of congestion the road officials can increase throughput simply by 
setting higher charges.  It is worth noting that congestion constraints induce 
the private highway-owner to vary the toll charge roughly in keeping with 
social-welfare maximization.  Furthermore, such charges not only reduce 
congestion on existing roads; they can help investors identify profitable ways 
to provide new ones. 
  
•  The old toll roads were plagued by toll evasion. The feasibility of private 
roads today is enhanced by electronic technologies that ease toll collection and 
prevent toll evasion. 
 
•  The old toll roads assembled and cleared their route swiftly and easily.  Today 
the process of environmental clearance involves tremendous delays, outlays, 
and uncertainties.  If new road facilities are going to be built, whether by 36 
private enterprise or by government, the clearance and entitlement process 
must somehow be simplified.     
 
  Looking back, one might say that the American people ran an experiment: 100 
years with extensive privately managed toll roads, and then another 100 years 
primarily of government managed “freeways.”  The historical record suggests that 
road provision is another case where the advantages of private ownership, relative to 
government ownership, and of user-fees, relative to tax financing, apply.  Learning 
from the mistakes of both epochs, Americans and people in other countries should 
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